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 Executive Summary 
 
This paper provides an analysis of 64 punitive damages awards of at least $100 million.  
Based on an inventory of these cases, there is evidence that these blockbuster awards are highly 
concentrated geographically, as two states account for 27 of the 64 awards.  The awards also 
have been rising substantially over time, with the majority of these blockbuster awards taking 
place since 1999.  An assessment of the current status of the blockbuster punitive damages 
awards indicates that most of these awards have been appealed, but the reversal of these punitive 
damages awards is the exception rather than the rule.  Many large punitive damages awards are 
settled without any appeal.  The ratio limits outlined in State Farm v. Campbell will affect over 
90% of the blockbuster awards and over 90% of the damages associated with these awards if a 
ratio of 1.0 becomes the upper limit on punitive damages.   
   1
The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards 
W. Kip Viscusi 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Punitive damages represent the most visible symptom of the ills of the U.S. tort system.  
Because of the magnitude of punitive damages, headlines often tout the levels of penalties being 
imposed and the economic horrors that could result from such awards.  Such accounts do not, 
however, provide a reliable indication of the magnitude of punitive damages awards.  To provide 
a perspective on the frequency and amount of the large punitive damages awards, this paper 
provides a comprehensive inventory of what I term the “blockbuster” punitive damages awards 
and the ultimate economic costs that they impose. 
Punitive damages have attracted the interest of tort reformers for good reason.  Much of 
the concern with respect to punitive damages stems from the imprecise guidance that juries are 
given in setting the award levels.  A recent series of experimental studies has examined the way 
in which these awards are set as well as a variety of shortcomings of jury behavior.
1  Punitive 
damages instructions seldom give jurors precise numerical guidance that they can use in setting 
the damages amount.  Moreover, sometimes there is a tendency of jurors not to attend to the 
specific instructions that are given.  Even if one were to provide jurors with specific numerical 
guidance to assist them in setting punitive damages awards, such as to use the optimal deterrence 
theory implicit in law and economics principles, jurors either cannot or will not embrace such a 
methodology.
2   
The positive aspect of jury behavior is that jurors appear to be quite capable of reaching a 
consensus with respect to whether a particular behavior is morally blameworthy.  The difficulty 
arises when jurors must then translate their moral outrage at wrongful conduct into a dollar 
penalty amount.  The inability of jurors to carry out this task successfully leads to much greater 
variability in award levels than in jurors’ assessment of the blameworthiness of the behavior.   
                                                 
1 For a compilation of many of these studies, see Cass R. Sunstein, Reid Hastie, John W, Payne, David A. 
Schkade and W. Kip Viscusi., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (2002). 
2 Id. at 132-170.   Also see W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 (2) J. 
LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001).   2
The result is a series of shortcomings in jury decision-making that are difficult to 
overcome.  Decisions regarding liability and recklessness may be seriously flawed.  Jurors may 
be subject to a variety of hindsight biases in which they are unable to take themselves back to the 
pre-accident situation in assessing whether the defendant has been reckless and punitive damages 
are warranted.
3  Jurors also appear to be quite ill-suited to undertaking the kind of broadly based 
national benefit-cost analysis that is needed to assess whether the appropriate balance between 
risk and cost has been struck for mass-marketed products.
4  Jurors may also be subject to 
anchoring effects whereby plaintiffs’ attorneys suggest plausible but possibly irrelevant dollar 
anchors to create a focal point for jury decision-making and to boost the value of the award.
5   
The very large punitive damages awards are the target of many punitive damages reform 
efforts because of their potentially damaging economic consequences.  These extremely large 
awards sometimes run into the billions of dollars and are highly unpredictable.  As a result, they 
will not have a deterrent effect because the penalties for wrongful conduct are not anticipated.  
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that there is no significant safety incentive effect from 
punitive damages.
6  Large awards also may tend to depress innovation and deter the introduction 
of new, but risky, products that might expand the scope of the firm’s liability.  On an empirical 
basis, increasing the level of liability costs in an industry initially increases innovation but 
eventually has a negative depressing effect.
7  Moreover, as emphasized by Rubin, Calfee, and 
Grady, the level of punitive awards and the contexts in which these large penalties generate 
economic consequences on balance are harmful to consumer interests.
8  
                                                 
3 Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade, & John W. Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on 
judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23(5) LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1999).  See also W. Kip 
Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk, 1(1/2) AMER. LAW & ECON. REV. 26(1999).  
4 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 228-233, and W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Analysis: A Reckless Act? , 52(3) 
STANFORD LAW REV. 547 (2000). 
5 Id. at 62-74. 
6 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages against Corporations in Environmental and 
Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 
GEO. L.J. 381 (1998). 
7 See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation, 
101(1) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 161 (1993). 
8 Paul H. Rubin, John E. Calfee, and Mark F. Grady, BMW v. Gore: Mitigating The Punitive Economics 
of Punitive Damages, 5 S. CT. ECON. REV. 179 (1997).   3
A potential rebuttal to these concerns is the claim that such awards are not unpredictable 
but are in fact highly predictable.
9  Moreover, according to advocates of punitive damages, the 
award levels that garner the headlines may not be an accurate reflection of the ultimate cost of 
these major punitive damage awards.  If these awards are reversed on appeal, for example, then 
the economic cost will be reduced, perhaps even eliminated in particular cases.   
The focus of this article is on the blockbuster awards and on their ultimate implications 
for the costs imposed on defendants.  The article will not delve into issues such as whether 
punitive damages awards are set appropriately by jurors or whether they have beneficial or 
harmful effects on the economy.  Rather, the emphasis will be much more focused on developing 
an inventory of the blockbuster awards and their ultimate disposition. 
The article begins with a comprehensive inventory of what I call the “blockbuster” 
punitive damages awards.  Whereas $1 million awards used to be adequate to generate media 
coverage for a substantial award, we now live in an era in which there may be award levels of 
even a billion dollars or more.  The threshold I will use for identifying the blockbuster awards is 
a punitive damages award amount of $100 million.  I have identified 64 such awards to date.   
In addition to simply tallying these various awards, it is useful to explore how the 
distribution of these awards varies with different matters of concern.  Are, for example, judges 
just as likely to award such blockbuster punitive damages awards as are juries?  Are these awards 
predictable based on the level of compensatory damages in the case?  Is there a trend in such 
blockbuster award levels, or have they always been a standard feature of the legal landscape?  
Are particular venues responsible for most of the awards, or are they uniformly distributed 
throughout the United States?   
After examining these issues, I will then turn to examine the current status of these 
awards.  In particular, to what extent are these awards currently under appeal?  Have many of 
these awards been settled or overturned by the courts?   
Finally, I will examine the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in State Farm v. 
Campbell
10 on the blockbuster awards.  That decision provided the most concrete guidance to 
date on the reasonable ranges for punitive damages awards.  To what extent will the guidance 
                                                 
9 For an interesting exchange on this predictability issue, see Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability 
of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997), and A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages 
Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (1997). 
10 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).   4
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in this decision constrain blockbuster awards?  In that 
regard, it will be interesting to compare how the various numerical guidelines the Court provided 
on the permissible ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages will affect the 
blockbuster awards as compared with punitive damages awards more generally.   
Overall, there has been an explosive growth in punitive damages awards of $100 million 
or more as well as a substantial increase in the number of $1 billion or more punitive damages 
awards.  State Farm v. Campbell has the potential to have a dramatic effect on the overwhelming 
majority of these punitive awards and on the total economic costs they impose.   
 
2.  Inventory of the Blockbuster Awards 
 
This article focuses on the blockbuster award-level punitive damage award levels that are 
at least $100 million.
11  Although there is nothing unique about the $100 million cutoff, it does 
make the inventory of large punitive damage award levels much more manageable than would a 
lower cutoff of, for example, $1 million.  Moreover, it is these very extreme punitive damages 
awards that receive the greatest media attention and serve as the focal point for liability reform 
efforts.  An award in this range also was the case considered in the recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in State Farm v. Campbell. 
The nature of the search undertaken by Joni Hersch and myself involved an extensive 
review of a wide variety of available sources.  The search included LEXIS combined jury 
verdicts and settlements, a variety of Westlaw databases, articles in American Lawyer, major 
newspapers, and the Google search engine.  In all, there were 64 punitive damages awards that 
met the $100 million cutoff.  The first such award was in 1985, but the search was not limited to 
awards starting at that date.  Rather, the search process simply did not identify any awards that 
met the $100 million cutoff before 1985.  The search also includes all awards identified through 
the end of 2003.   
Table 1 provides a listing of these 64 blockbuster awards and some of their principal case 
characteristics for bench trials and then for jury trials.  The first column of the table lists the case 
name and the state in which the award was made.  The second column gives the year of the 
                                                 
11 The inventory I provide in Table 1 is an update of Table 1 in Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive 
Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33(1) J. LEGAL STUD. (2004).     5
decision.  The third column gives the level of the punitive damages award.  The cases appear in 
increasing order of the magnitude of the punitive damages award.  The final column of the table 
calculates the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.  While there is no specific 
numerical value that such a ratio should hold in order to be an appropriate punitive damages 
award, the U.S. Supreme Court frequently discusses the reasonableness of punitive damages 
awards in terms of this ratio and has recently provided guidance with respect to what the 
appropriate ratio should be.   
The top panel of Table 1 summarizes the awards that were the result of bench trials, 
while the bottom panel of the table gives the punitive damages awards levied by juries.  Only 
three of the 64 cases that appear in Table 1 were the result of bench trials.  Overall, juries 
accounted for over 95% of all cases in which there was a punitive damages award of at least 
$100 million.   
This greater relative role of juries in awarding substantial punitive damages is consistent 
with the statistical analyses of a large sample of state court data from 1996 in Hersch and 
Viscusi.
12  That article using the 1996 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts data showed that, 
controlling for case characteristics and venue, juries were more likely to award punitive damages 
than were judges, and juries were likely to award a greater amount of punitive damages as well.  
The differences that were most apparent were at the extremely high end of the punitive damages 
spectrum, as juries were more responsible for the largest awards.  There were few differences 
between judges and jurors in terms of awarding low and moderate levels of punitive damages.  
This greater relative role of juries with respect to very large punitive damages awards is 
consistent with the findings in Table 1, in which juries play a dominant role.  The jury share of 
blockbuster punitive damages cases is also greater than the fraction of cases handled by juries 
rather than bench trials.
13   
Large corporate defendants appear to be especially well represented in this listing of 
blockbuster cases.  The cigarette industry has been particularly noteworthy in making an 
appearance on this listing, which notably excludes the settlement of the state cases against the 
tobacco industry that were settled for an amount in excess of $240 billion.
14  That huge 
                                                 
12 Id.   
13 Id.at 8. 
14 For discussion of the settlement and its costs, see W. Kip Viscusi, Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem 
on the Tobacco Deal (2002).   6
settlement amount and the attendant publicity may in part have served as an anchor for 
subsequent punitive damages awards in the billions.
15   
The largest bench trial award in Table 1 is for a class-action case, Price v. Philip Morris 
Inc., in which there were claims that smokers of light cigarettes were the victims of fraud 
because light cigarettes were not safer than conventional cigarettes.
16  This class action took 
place in Madison County, Illinois, which some observers have suggested is a haven for plaintiff-
oriented class actions.
17  This $10.2 billion total damages award required that the company post a 
$12 billion bond during the appeal, creating problems for the defendant, so the Illinois Supreme 
Court cut the bond amount to $6 billion and agreed to hear the company's appeal directly, rather 
than allowing the case to go to the Appellate Court.
18  Thus, the large stakes of these cases may 
affect the feasibility of the different options the defendants are able to pursue. 
Four of the jury trials listed in Table 1 also involved cigarette industry defendants, and 
one was a class action.  There were individual smoker cases that led to punitive damages awards 
of $150 million in Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc., $3 billion in Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., and 
$28 billion in Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc.  In addition, the Florida class-action of Engle v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. led to a $145 billion punitive damages award in that state.   
Cases involving automobile companies are also prominently represented.  The listing of 
jury awards includes three cases in which the defendant was General Motors, one case in which 
Ford was the defendant, and one case in which Chrysler was the defendant.  In addition, cases 
involving tire manufacturers and companies that provide insurance for automobile accidents also 
have been the target of these major awards.  Motor vehicle travel poses well-known, often 
inherent risks.   
                                                 
15 Id. at 58.   
16 This case was formerly Miles v. Philip Morris Inc. 
17 Madison County, Illinois’ nicknames include “The Lawsuit Capital of the World” and “Class-Action 
Paradise,” Amalia Deligiannis, Madison County: A Corporation’s Worst Nightmare, CORP. LEGAL TIMES 
52, February 2004 (col. 1), and the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) issued a report in 2003 in 
which Madison County, Illinois was named the number one “Judicial Hellhole” and a “jackpot 
jurisdiction,” ATRA report, “Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes, 2003,” available at 
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf at 9.  See also 12 (31) CORP. LEGAL TIMES 54, October 
2002 (col. 1).   
18 John Flynn Rooney, Witnesses Take Sides On Limiting Appeal Bonds, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., January 
27, 2004, at 1.  Also see Michael Bologna, Illinois Courts Consider Appeal Bond Rules Following 
Landmark Philip Morris Decision, 33(6) BNA PRODUCT SAFETY AND LIABILITY REPORTER 133 (2004).   7
A third major cluster of cases involves companies that engage in the production of 
gasoline and chemicals.  Some of these cases involve environmental damages claims, as in the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill case against Exxon, whereas others involve contract disputes of various 
kinds.  As in the case of the tobacco industry and the automobile industry, the large stakes 
involved in these companies’ operations coupled with the fact that the products provided involve 
some inherent elements of risk often make these entities a target for these blockbuster punitive 
damages awards.   
After each case listed in Table 1 there is an indication of the state in which the award was 
made.  Table 2 summarizes the distribution of these awards by state, where the states are ordered 
in terms of the order of the blockbuster punitive damages awards that appear in Table 1.   
California and Texas head the list, as 27 of the 64 punitive damages awards in the table are in 
these two states.  Other venues that have developed a reputation for being sympathetic to 
plaintiffs also make an appearance in this table, as Alabama, Illinois, and Mississippi all rank just 
behind the leading punitive damages awards states.   
The third column in Table 2 lists the dollar magnitude of these awards, which are then 
converted into punitive damages per capita in the final column of Table 2.  Florida leads all 
states in terms of the magnitude and per capita value of punitive damages, owing almost entirely 
to the huge award in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., which accounts for $145 billion of the 
$145.7 billion in total punitive damages awards in the blockbuster cases in that state.  If we 
exclude the effect of this outlier, California ranks first in terms of punitive damages totals, 
followed by Arkansas and Texas.  In terms of the punitive damages amount per capita, Florida is 
followed very closely by Arkansas, with the next level of punitive damages values coming in 
California, Louisiana, and Alabama.   
Even with the large populations in California and Texas, one cannot make the case that 
blockbuster punitive damages awards are a random event with equal probability in every state.  
The population of New York is more than half that of California and larger that that of any other 
state in Table 2, but yet has never had a blockbuster punitive damages award.  There are 32 states 
that have never had a punitive damages award in excess of $100 million.   
The second column of information in Table 1 lists the year of the decision leading to the 
blockbuster award, where these years range from 1985 to 2003.  Table 3 breaks down the 
distribution of these time periods into five-year intervals to explore whether there has been any   8
change in the trend of these punitive damages awards.  The number of awards per time period 
clearly has been on the rise.  Just over half the punitive damages awards listed in Table 1 took 
place from 1999 to 2003.  Many of the remainder were in 1994-1998.   
However, the trend in the magnitude of awards does not rise steadily, in part because of 
the lumpy nature of some very large awards.  The pre-1989 period exhibited a total award 
amount in excess of that from 1989 to 1993 due to the influence of the $3 billion punitive 
damages award in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.  However, over 90% of all the blockbuster 
punitive damages award amounts took place from 1999-2003.  This total is strongly influenced 
by a particular outlier, in this case the $145 billion award in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
However, even excluding the influence of Engle, the most recent time period would exhibit the 
highest blockbuster punitive damages award total.  The general sense that extremely large 
punitive damages awards are increasing in frequency and in terms of the total dollar amount is 
certainly borne out by the evidence here.   
The final three columns of Table 1 list the punitive damages award amount, the 
compensatory damages award amount, and the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages.  A key concern in the literature has long been the extent to which compensatory 
damages are a predictor of the level of punitive damages and, in particular, whether they bear a 
reasonable relationship.
19  From the standpoint of the law and economics theory of optimal 
deterrence, there should be a strong linkage between the punitive damages amount and the 
compensatory damages amount, where the total of all damages should equal the compensatory 
damages value divided by the probability that there will be detection and conviction of the 
wrongful conduct.
20  Punitive damages ratios have also played a prominent role in 
pronouncements by the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the reasonableness of punitive 
damages amounts.
21   
                                                 
19 For studies that examine this relationship, see Eisenberg, supra note 9, and Polinsky, supra note 9. 
20 This theory is discussed in A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998). 
21 In BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) the Court remarked that “perhaps [the] 
most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the 
actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.”  Id. at 580.  See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 
(1991) (finding that a ratio of 4 to 1 is not constitutionally improper).  But see TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (affirming a judgment in which punitives were over 526 
times the actual damages).   9
A long-standing statistical concern in the literature has been the extent to which punitive 
damages are predictable in terms of whether the level of compensatory damages are predictive of 
what the value of punitive damages will be.  It should be emphasized that this “predictability” 
overstates the degree of predictability that the defendant would have at the time the defendant 
engaged in the wrongful conduct.  The defendant does not know whether the wrongful conduct 
will in fact lead to a finding of liability and any compensatory damages award and whether there 
will also be a punitive damages award.  Thus, this predictability will be in terms of whether 
conditional on there being both a compensatory damages award and a punitive damages award, 
is there a strong statistical relationship between these two values.   
Table 4 summarizes two sets of regression results linking punitive damages to 
compensatory damages.  The first set of results in panel A is a simple regression of the punitive 
damages value against a constant term and the compensatory damages value, where the sample 
used for this analysis excludes Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. because the compensatory 
damages award for the class representatives reflects a different scope of damages than are 
reflected in the punitive damages award for the entire class.  In terms of the linear specification 
in panel A, there is no statistically significant relationship between compensatory damages and 
punitive damages.  Indeed, this variable has no explanatory power in a simple regression, with an 
adjusted R-squared that is negative.   
The specification in panel B regresses the log of punitive damages against the log of 
compensatory damages.  The logarithmic transformation mutes the effect of outliers with respect 
to punitive damages.  Once this transformation is done, there is a weak but statistically 
significant relationship between the log of compensatory damages and the log of punitive 
damages, which explains 6% of the variation in the log of punitive damages.   
The coefficient of the log of compensatory damages, which is statistically significant, has 
a convenient interpretation as well.  What the coefficient of 0.163 implies is that every ten 
percent change in compensatory damages levels will increase the value of the punitive damages 
award by 1.63%.  Thus, the elasticity of the response of punitive damages to the level of 
compensatory damages is relatively low for these blockbuster cases.   
These empirical estimates do not imply that it is impossible to develop a statistical model 
that is predictive of the level of punitive damages.  As was discussed earlier, many of the largest 
awards are concentrated among industries that sell tobacco products, automobiles, and gasoline   10
and chemicals.  Firms in these industries or other deep pocket enterprises are more heavily 
represented in the blockbuster awards sample, especially at the high end.  However, the question 
being addressed here is not whether one could increase the explanatory power of the punitive 
damages equation by simply adding other explanatory variables to the equation.  That the 
explanatory power of the models could be increased by doing so certainly is the case.  However, 
the key result is that the relationship between the level of compensatory damages and punitive 
damages is very weak for the blockbuster awards sample.  Moreover, it also should be 
emphasized that even this limited statistical explanatory power is not tantamount to the award 
being predictable by the defendant before the wrongful conduct, as firms do not know in advance 
whether compensatory damages will be awarded and, if so, what their level will be.   
 
3.  The Current Status of the Blockbuster Awards 
 
The actual level of punitive damages awards may potentially misrepresent the economic 
effect of such awards in two principal ways.  These awards may be reduced on appeal or settled 
for a lesser amount, thus diminishing their economic impact.  An effect in the opposite direction 
is that major awards such as these may induce parties to settle cases before the punitive damages 
award is levied, thus inducing a potential understatement of the total economic cost associated 
with large punitive damages awards.   
To determine the extent to which the punitive damages awards are reflective of 
significant economic damages actually being paid, Table 5 provides a summary of the current 
status of all the blockbuster punitive damages awards listed in Table 1.  This table numbers the 
cases for ease of reference in subsequent breakdowns of the different case dispositions.  This 
summary relies on publicly available information and was undertaken in much the same manner 
as was the compilation of the original case list in Table 1.
22  In some instances, the status of the 
cases has not been resolved, as the case may still be under appeal.  In other instances, there may 
be information that the case settled, but no information on the actual amount of the settlement.  It 
is noteworthy that such nondisclosure of the settlement amount appears to be the norm for such 
                                                 
22 The one exception is Amoco Chemical Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London.  That case 
disposition is based on information obtained at the listed website.  In an email exchange on Feb. 29, 2004, 
the internet site side author identified Mealey’s Litigation Insurance Reporter as the source of the 
settlement information.     11
settlements, as almost every settlement was for a confidential amount, and for those in which the 
amount is not entirely confidential, often the best available information is an estimated 
settlement range.  For two of the cases there is no information that I have been able to identify 
regarding the current status of these cases.   
To organize the overall flow of these 64 cases, Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic 
summary of cases listed by number from Table 5 in terms of the process that they underwent 
following the original punitive damages award.  The first category listed consists of cases in 
which the defendant filed an appeal, but this category includes 39 of the 64 cases listed in Table 
1.  Among the cases that are appealed, ten were reversed, an additional three cases were reversed 
and subsequently led to an out-of-court settlement with the parties, and one case was reversed 
and is now under appeal.   
The most prominent of these reversed cases is Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
23  This 
$145 billion punitive damages class action was not included in the regression analysis linking 
punitive damages to compensatory damages because the compensatory damages in this case 
amounting to only $12.7 million were only for the class representatives, whereas the $145 billion 
punitive damages award was for the entire class.  This mismatch between the scope for 
calculating compensatory damages and punitive damages is not only a problem for statistical 
analysis but also creates problems for judicial assessment of the appropriateness of such a 
punitive damages award.  In particular, the calculated ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages based on the available information regarding punitive damages and compensatory 
damages was 11,417, but what the ratio would be if the compensatory award reflected 
compensatory damages for the entire class cannot be determined. 
In its decision overturning the punitive damages award, the court made a similar 
observation:  
 
Establishment of this reasonable relationship requires a prior determination of the 
compensatory damages caused by the alleged misconduct.  c Op. Att’y Gen. Fla., 
2000. WL 329587 (Fla. A.G. 2000) (“[I]n the absence of any determination of the 
extent of compensatory damages, the court lacks a standard by which it can judge 
                                                 
23 Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. App. , 2003).   12
whether an assessment of punitive damages is reasonable or is grossly 
excessive”).
24   
 
Without this prior determination, any comparison between a punitive award and the “actual 
harm” is impossible.  For this reason, federal and other state courts have repeatedly held that 
compensatory damages must be tried before punitive damages.   
The court also observed that the $145 billion punitive damages award was a record-
breaking amount that was too great to be permitted:  
 
This trial produced the largest punitive damage verdict in American legal history.  
As acknowledged by even the plantiffs’ purported experts, the $145 billion 
punitive award will extract all value from the defendants and put them out of 
business, in violation of established Florida law that prohibits bankrupting 
punitive awards.
25   
 
The next category of cases in Figure 1 consists of punitive damages cases in which the 
verdict was affirmed.  This category consisted of two cases from Table 1, one of which was 
subsequently appealed.  These affirmed cases had ratios of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages of 4.6 and 1.3. 
The third category of appeals consists of cases currently under appeal.  Five cases are in 
this category in which the party has filed an appeal but there has not yet been a court decision.   
The fourth category of appeals listed in Figure 1 consists of those in which punitive 
damages have been reduced.  In three cases, the appeal led to a reduction in punitive damages 
which was not subsequently appealed and did not lead to an out-of-court settlement.  In five 
cases there was a reduction of punitive damages and either a current appeal and either a possible 
or pending appeal in the case.  Three cases in which punitive damages were reduced led to a 
settlement.  For the cases in which the appeal led to a reduction in punitive damages, the amount 
of punitive damages remained substantial even after the appeal.  The award in Forti v. General 
Dynamics Corp. was reduced to $30 million, well below its earlier value of $100 million and 
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yielding a punitive to compensatory damages ratio of 4.1.  The $124.57 million punitive award in 
Proctor v. Davis and Upjohn Co. was reduced to $6.1 million, yielding a ratio of 1.9.  The 
appeals court in Romo v. Ford Motor Co. reduced that $290 million award to a 5 to 1 ratio.  This 
case was subsequently settled by the parties for $23.7 million.
26  The appeals process yielded a 
punitive damages award of $300 million (ratio of 1.3) in Hayes v. Courtney, $100 million (ratio 
of 18.0) in Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., $850 million (ratio of 425) in In re New Orleans Tank 
Car Leakage Fire Litigation, $1.09 billion (ratio of 10.1) in Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 
and $28 million (ratio of 43.1) in Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc. 
With the exception of this final individual smoker case, every reduction of a punitive 
damages award that had been at least $1 billion has failed to reduce the punitive award to under 
$100 million.  One possibility is that the large initial award does in fact reflect more serious harm 
and greater degrees of reckless behavior.  An alternative hypothesis is that very large jury awards 
have an anchoring effect in the subsequent appeals process, thus providing a reference point for 
the punitive damages amounts that will be set after being reduced by the appeals court. 
Four of the appeals have led to retrials, and in one case there was a new verdict.  This 
new verdict case, which is Exxon Corp. v. Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, 
is noteworthy in that it illustrates that obtaining a new trial as the result of an appeal may not 
always be to the defendant’s advantage, even in situations where the initial ratio of punitive 
damages may appear to be excessive.  This case involved an accounting dispute between Exxon 
and the state of Alabama.  The original punitive damages award was $3.4 billion, which led to a 
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 39.  As a result of the retrial, the jury 
lowered the compensatory damages amount from $87.7 million to $63.6 million.  However, the 
jury increased the punitive damages award from its earlier level to $11.8 billion.
27  The new 
punitive damages to compensatory damages ratio of 185.5 is more than four times as great as the 
original punitive damages ratio that was under appeal.  In March of 2004, the trial judge reduced 
the punitive award to $3.5 billion, resulting in a punitive to compensatory ratio of 55.
28 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 Id. at 456. 
26 Ford to Pay $23.7 Million to Rollover Plaintiff After $290 Million Punitive Award Is Tossed, 33(6) 
BNA PRODUCT SAFETY AND LIABILITY REPORTER 126 (2004).   
27 See Susan Warren, Exxon Verdict Reflects Wider Anger: Judgment of the $11.9 Billion in Alabama 
Underscores Distrust of Companies, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at A6.   
28 Thaddeus Herrick, Judge Cuts Verdict Against Exxon In Alabama Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2004, at 
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The next category in Figure 1 consists of cases that were settled.  In all, 22 cases were 
settled, but this tally reflects case 59, In re New Orleans Tank Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 
which appears as a settled case for all but one defendant and as a case that, for one of the 
defendants in the case, led to an appeal, a reduction in punitive damages, and a subsequent 
appeal.  Thus, this case is the only case in Figure 1 that appears in two different locations.   
The amount of the settlement in these cases is difficult to compare to the initial punitive 
damages award.  For 15 of the 22 cases the settlement amount is confidential.  In one instance, 
Rubicon Petroleum Inc. v. Amoco Production Co., the settlement amount is an estimated value of 
10 percent of the total $500 million verdict.  Even in the other instances in which the settlement 
amount is known, only the settlement for the entire case is known, not just the punitive damages 
share of the settlement amount.  There were settlement values of $60 million for Tennessee Gas 
Pipeline v. KCS Resources Inc., $7.5 million for The Robert J. Bellott Insurance Agency Inc. v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., $20 million for Fuqua v. Horizon/CMS 
Healthcare Corp., $242 million for Igen International Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, and $23 
million for Beckman Coulter Inc. v. Flextronics International Ltd.   
The final categories in Figure 1 include one case that was reduced by the trial judge, two 
cases in which there has been no payment made to the plaintiff and no appeal of the case, and 
two cases for which there is no available information.  One of the no-payment cases involved 
defendants that are out of the business in Perez v. William Recht Co., Inc.  The second no-
payment case involves a fugitive killer who has been extradited from France to the United States, 
but there is no payment that has yet been made in Maddux v. Einhorn.   
The overall pattern that emerges from Figure 1 is that the disposition of the blockbuster 
punitive damages awards does not fit any single simple pattern such as all these cases being 
appealed, with the verdict being reversed or reduced to modest levels.  Many cases are of course 
appealed, but many of these are settled, and even in cases in which the punitive damages are 
reduced, the damages often remain substantial.  In addition, a considerable share of cases lead to 
out-of-court settlements before any appeal, and larger punitive damages awards will tend to 
increase the bargaining power of plaintiffs in any such negotiation.  Because almost all these 
settlements are confidential, it is difficult to assess their ultimate economic effect.  However, the 
publicized settlement amounts are as high as the $3 billion settlement in Pennzoil v. Texaco, and 
court reductions of punitive damages awards are sometimes in the billions of dollars, but are   15
often over $100 million as well.  The stakes remain considerable even if not at the full original 
blockbuster amount in most of these instances.   
 
 
4.  The Effect of State Farm v. Campbell 
 
The 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decision in State Farm v. Campbell
29 potentially imposes 
the greatest structure to date on punitive damages.  Whereas the Court previously had not 
specified a ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages that was ideal, and still has yet to 
be that explicit, in this recent decision the Court did attempt to bring some discipline to the 
setting of punitive damages and did so by indicating ranges of acceptable ratios.   
The main target that has emerged is that of single-digit ratios: “Our jurisprudence and the 
principles it has established demonstrate, however, that in practice, few awards exceeding a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will 
satisfy due process.”
30  The Court went on to observe that for the punitive damages award cases 
in which there are substantial compensatory damages as well, one would expect the ratio 
generally to be much lower than a nine-to-one ratio: “When compensatory damages are 
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the 
outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”
31   
Based on these observations as well as related statements in the Supreme Court decision, 
the empirical analysis below will focus on the implications of admissible ratios of punitive 
damages of 1.0 and 9.0, thus reflecting these two different ratios indicated by the Court.  These 
were not, however, the only ratios discussed, as the decision also commented on other ratios such 
as treble damages rules as well as previous court decisions that permitted ratios greater than 1.0: 
“In Haslip, in upholding a punitive damages award, we concluded that an award of more than 
four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional 
impropriety.”
32   
                                                 
29 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). 
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Despite these various types of numerical guidelines provided by the Court, there were 
also exceptions indicated whereby a high punitive damages to compensatory damages ratio may 
not be indicative of an excessive award if compensatory damages are sufficiently small.
33  
Whether plaintiffs’ attorneys will be successful in claiming that compensatory damages amounts 
are small in relationship to the overall harm that has been inflicted, thus avoiding the limiting 
effect of such restraints, is not yet clear.   
The effect of State Farm v. Campbell on these blockbuster punitive damages awards was 
almost immediate.  The first blockbuster award after this decision was in Beckman Coulter Inc. 
v. Flextronics International Ltd.  That case led to a punitive damages award of $931 million, 
which had a ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 321.  Within two months 
after this verdict, the parties settled the case for a total of $23 million.
34  The case involved a 
compensatory damages amount of $2.9 million so that a settlement of $23 million implies an 
approximate punitive damages settlement value of $20.1 million, for a ratio of punitive damages 
to compensatory damages of 6.9.  This value is within the U.S. Supreme Court guidelines of an 
upper limit that is a single-digit ratio, whereas the original ratio of 321 would be clearly 
inconsistent with the Court’s guidelines. 
The decision and the appeal of Romo v. Ford Motor Co.
35 also took place after State 
Farm v. Campbell and was strongly influenced by the guidance provided in that case.  The 
original ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was 54.7.  The state of California 
Court of Appeal made repeated references to State Farm v. Campbell in overturning the original 
punitive damages award.  Included among the observations of the court were the following:  
 
First, we conclude State Farm’s constitutionalization of the historical pre-
Grimshaw punitive damages doctrines as part of federal due process means that 
the jury was fundamentally misinstructed concerning the amount of punitive 
                                                 
33 In particular, the Court observed: “Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive 
damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with 
due process where a ‘particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic 
damages.’”  Id. 
34 Scott Thurm, Flextronics Will Pay $23 Million to Beckman to Settle a Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 
2003, at B3. 
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damages it could award in the present case.
36 … Accordingly, plaintiffs’ counsel 
argued that the award should be large enough to force Ford to recall all remaining 
1978 and 1979 Broncos and “crush them to dust.”  Counsel argued that $1 billion 
was the appropriate award based on the profit Ford made on all 1978-1979 
Broncos, factored to reflect Ford’s use of that money over the next 20 years.  
Finally, counsel requested $1 billion so the resulting publicity would reach all 
remaining owners of this model Bronco so they would know how dangerous the 
vehicle was.  These considerations are impermissible under State Farm and 
plaintiffs’ arguments served to magnify the impact of the misinstruction
37…. For 
reasons described above, we do not believe that the deathly harm component of 
the punitive award in the present case is strictly constrained by the single-digit 
multiplier set forth in State Farm.  Nevertheless, we note the overall punitive 
damages award we find appropriate after independent review, $23,723,287, is 
approximately five times the total compensatory damages award in this case.
38 
 
Why the Romo Court adopted a ratio of 5 to 1 rather than some other ratio is not clearcut.  
While the court did discuss reasons for diverging from a one-to-one ratio, there is no explicit 
guidance given in State Farm that would enable any court or jury to map their concerns into a 
particular punitive ratio above 1 but not exceeding 9.  The parties subsequently settled this case 
for $23.7 million.
39  
Interestingly, in the appeal of the Exxon Valdez oil spill case that took place after State 
Farm, the importance of the punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio in conjunction with 
the limits imposed by State Farm led to a dispute over the value of compensatory damages, 
which is the denominator in the ratio.  Higher values of compensatory damages will make higher 
values of punitive damages conform to any given ratio value.  The plaintiffs in this case claimed 
that the compensatory damages amount was $517.2, and the defendant claimed the compensatory 
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damages value was $20.3 million.  The judge selected a value of $507 million, with the result 
being that a $5 billion punitive award would not exceed a 10 to 1 ratio.
40  
If, however, State Farm exerts a disciplinary role, it is likely to constrain some of the 
wildest excesses of punitive damages in excess of compensatory damages so long as 
compensatory damages values can be reasonably well defined.  To the extent that these and other 
cases fall into line with the guidance provided by State Farm v. Campbell, one would expect a 
potentially dramatic effect on the permitted level of punitive damages awards.   
To examine the effect of the ratio limits of an upper limit of 9 and an upper limit of 1 for 
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, Table 6 presents the influence of such 
limits for the blockbuster award cases excluding the class-action case Engle v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co.  In addition, Table 6 also reports the effect of these guidelines on a large sample of 
state court punitive damages awards drawn from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996.
41  
The punitive damages in state courts are much more modest in scale than the blockbuster awards.  
The median punitive damages award was $50,000 in jury trials and $33,000 in bench trials.
42  
The first ratio limit indicated in Table 6 is the single-digit ratio of 9.0.  If that were the cap on 
punitive damages, it would reduce the total blockbuster awards from $70.3 billion to $14.2 
billion.  Only 20% of the awards and 43% of the cases would be under that limit.  If, however, a 
ratio limit of 1 were imposed, only 9% of the awards and 8% of the cases in the blockbuster 
category would meet this test.   
For the state court sample shown in the final column of Table 6, the ratio limit of 9 is less 
constraining because the typical punitive damages award in state courts tends to have a lower 
ratio than do the blockbuster awards.  Thus, 96% of the punitive damages awards in state courts 
would be under the ratio limit of 9.  However, because the larger damages cases would tend to 
fail the test, only 43% of the total punitive damages awards would meet that test.   
If the ratio limit were reduced to 1, there would be a much more constraining effect in 
terms of the percentage of awards that would be permitted.  The blockbuster awards meeting this 
cutoff drop to a 9 percent of total awards and 8 percent of total cases.  There is a similar dramatic 
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effect on the representative state court sample, as only 6 percent of the total award amounts are 
under a cap of 1.0 even though 71 percent of the cases met that cutoff. 
How different levels of permissible ratio caps would affect the blockbuster awards is 
illustrated in Figure 2.  This figure explores ratio cap values ranging from 1 to 20, thus starting at 
the lower end of the U.S. Supreme Court’s guidelines and going to a value that is more than 
twice the single-digit ratio limit.  The darker bars in the figure indicate the fraction of cases that 
will be under various punitive damages limits.  Thus, for any punitive damages/compensatory 
damages ratio value on the horizontal axis the dark bars indicate the fraction of cases that have a 
punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio that is not in excess of that value.  The fraction of 
cases that will below any given ratio limit  rises fairly steadily from under 10% for a limit of 1 to 
about 40% for a limit of  7, to over 50% once the limit hits 18.   
The light bars in Figure 2 indicate the fraction of total punitive damages award values in 
the blockbuster sample that have a punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio at or below 
the ratio indicated on the horizontal axis.  The amount of punitive damages awards in the 
blockbuster category that will be permitted as the ratio limit is increased is a much flatter 
relationship than is the relationship of the fraction of cases to the ratio limit.  Thus, close to 10% 
of the punitive damages award amounts would be permitted with a ratio of 1.0, and this figure 
does not reach 20% until a ratio of 9.  Even if the permitted ratio is increased to a value as high 
as 20, only 30% of the awards in the blockbuster category would meet that test.  Blockbuster 
awards by their very nature tend to be outliers and usually have a high ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages. 
What is apparent is that almost any reasonable ratio for the blockbuster cases will have a 
dramatic effect on the total dollar value represented by the blockbuster awards that far exceeds 
its influence on the fraction of cases.  The reason for this relative impact is that the blockbuster 
awards tend to have a disproportionate number of cases in which the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages is wildly excessive given the existing guidance of reasonableness that the 
courts have provided. 
Figure 3 presents analogous effects for the large 1996 sample of state court awards.   
Thus, Figure 3 indicates the fraction of cases with punitive award complying with different 
permitted ratios and the fraction of total punitive damages award amounts represented by cases 
in compliance with different permitted ratios.  The results for the state court sample indicate that   20
at very low cap values, a very large fraction of cases will be under the cap but only a very small 
portion of the total punitive awards.  These cases are of more modest scale than the blockbuster 
cases and more often than not have punitive damages awards that do not exceed compensatory 
damages, whereas the opposite is true for the blockbuster cases.   
What is most remarkable about the results in Figure 3 is that for the state court sample, 
the choice of the punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio limit has an almost negligible 
effect on the fraction of cases affected or the fraction of total damages awards affected for ratios 
ranging from 8 to 20.  At a permissible ratio near the upper end of the single digit ratio limit, just 
over 40 percent of total punitive damages awards and over 90 percent of the cases would not 
violate that constraint.  If, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in State Farm had specified that the 
upper limit should be 20, then the practical result in Figure 3 for state cases would be unchanged 
from the guidance they did provide.  In contrast, the fraction of punitive damages awards for 
blockbuster cases that would be unaffected by a cap of 20 is about 50 percent greater than the 
amount that would be unaffected by a single-digit ratio cap.   
The inquiry thus far has focused on the fraction of the blockbuster awards and state court 
awards that would meet the test imposed by different values of the cap.  The operational 
significance of a cap, if enforced, is however a bit different.  Awards with punitive 
damages/compensatory damages ratios under the cap presumably will be unaffected if we can 
assume that the cap is a well-defined constraint.  However, awards in excess of the cap will not 
simply disappear.  In the previous tallies of punitive damages awards under the cap in Figures 2 
and 3 all punitive awards with ratios above the cap in effect counted as zero.  They did not 
contribute to the share of total award values currently under the cap.  However, if the courts 
begin to impose cap values, the practical result will not be that these cases will have no punitive 
damages.  Some punitive damages values may get reduced or overturned on appeal or lead to 
settlements.  For concreteness, suppose that the punitive damage awards in excess of the capped 
value are reduced to a level so that the cap constraint is met exactly.  Thus, if there were a 
maximum permitted punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio of 1.0, the punitive damages 
amount in Hedrick v Sentry Insurance Co. will decrease from its actual award level of $100 
million to $2.17 million, which is the value of compensatory damages in the case.  For a binding 
ratio cap of 2 in this case, the punitive award will be reduced to $4.34 million.  Thus, even 
though the punitive award may violate higher values of the cap, as the permitted ratio of punitive   21
damages/compensatory damages is increased plaintiffs will get to keep more of their punitive 
award.  Undertaking a similar analysis for all the blockbuster cases and overall state court cases 
considered previously, what fraction of total awards will still be permitted to be imposed under 
different cap levels? 
Figure 4 illustrates how the fraction of total awards that will be imposed varies with 
different punitive damages caps.  In each instance a larger share of the state court sample of 
awards is imposed irrespective of the value of the cap.  Moreover, both of those award 
components indicate a steadily rising total damages cost as the cap is raised.  For a cap of 1, 
approximately 13 percent of the blockbuster awards and over 26 percent of state punitive awards 
will be imposed.  With an upper limit of a ratio of 9, 30 percent of the cost of blockbuster awards 
will be imposed and 63 percent of the state court award cost will be imposed.  By the time the 
ratio limit equals 20, over 87 percent of the state court award cost and about 40 percent of the 
blockbuster award cost will be imposed if the cap serves as a binding constraint.   
In each instance, the total award cost that will be imposed as a result of a cap, as shown 
in Figure 4, is much more sensitive to the choice of the cap than is the fraction of all awards that 
will lie under different values of the cap, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.  The reason for the 
difference is that in Figure 4 every increase in the value of the cap boosts the amount of punitive 
damages that could be levied for all cases above the cap but are now reduced to a value equal the 
cap.  However, in Figures 2 and 3 the only matter of concern was which awards were already 
under the cap rather than how total awards would change if violators of the cap were brought 
into compliance with the cap. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The blockbuster punitive damages awards have generated substantial attention in the 
media and in appeals court decisions for good reason.  Award levels in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars, and with increasing frequency in the billions of dollars, impose substantial economic 
costs.  In some cases, these awards could threaten the economic viability of the defendant as a 
result of only a single case.   
These excessive awards may be concentrated on particular industries, thus increasing the 
viability of firms marketing risky products.  Individual cigarette smoker cases have generated   22
punitive damages amounts of $28 billion, $3 billion, and $150 million.  With an estimated 
400,000 smokers dying per year from smoking-related illnesses, these stakes could become quite 
substantial indeed.  Tobacco class actions have generated punitive awards of $145 billion and 
$7.1 billion. 
The actual economic cost of these awards that is ultimately imposed almost invariably is 
less than the punitive damages award level.  Some of these verdicts are reduced on appeal, while 
others are settled for an amount less than the actual award level.  However, examination of the 
current status of the punitive damages awards indicates that it is certainly not true that appeals 
and settlements reduce the stakes of these punitive damages awards to an inconsequential 
amount.  Even awards reduced on appeal can be $100 million or more. 
The punitive damages landscape is likely to be substantially different in the wake of State 
Farm v. Campbell.  To the extent that punitive damages are not permitted to exceed the value of 
compensatory damages, such a ratio will affect more than 90% of total blockbuster award 
amounts and 90% of all blockbuster award cases.  If, however, the punitive damages cap that 
becomes the norm is a single-digit ratio, there will be less of a constraining effect.  Moreover, if 
plaintiffs are able to argue successfully that the compensatory damages in their case are “small” 
so that a higher ratio is warranted, then the restraining effect of State Farm v. Campbell will be 
diminished.   
Suggested ratio caps and other forms of judicial discipline almost by their very nature 
have some kind of arbitrary element that does not supplant the need for a rational basis for 
setting punitive awards.  Ultimately, punitive damages will not function in a constructive manner 
until either juries are given jury instructions that enable them to set punitive damages in a 
sensible manner, or the responsibility for setting the level of punitive damages is transferred to 
judges.  The main lesson of the blockbuster awards sample is that, in many instances, juries have 
not received the guidance needed to enable them to set punitive damages in a sensible manner.  
The result is that we observe ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages that are as 
high as 1683 to 1, leading to punitive damages amounts in the billions in a situation in which the 
compensatory damages were only $2 million.   
Experimental studies that have examined the process by which jurors arrive at these 
punitive damage verdicts indicate that jurors are susceptible to a wide variety of biases, such as 
the influence of possibly irrelevant anchors used to frame their thinking about punitive damages   23
award amounts.  The California appeals court decision in Romo v. Ford Motor Co. indicates that 
the State Farm v. Campbell decision has already led the courts to become more attuned to efforts 
by plaintiffs’ attorneys to provide anchors that would lead juries to make awards in violation of 
the guidance of State Farm v. Campbell.  Further improvements in jury instructions to enable 
jurors to approach punitive damages in a manner that is consistent with State Farm v. Campbell 
will undoubtedly enhance the performance of juries and reduce the excesses reflected in the 
blockbuster award amounts.  The longer-term task is not only to eliminate the most extreme 
excesses but to provide a workable methodology for setting reasonable levels of punitive 
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Table 1 
The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards of at Least $100 Million 
 
 














Bench Punitive Awards        
Clayton D. Smith, et al. v. Delta TV Corporation, Don Acy, US Electronics, American 
General Financial Center (Mississippi) 
1995 167.00 0.50 334.0 
       
Avery v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Automobile Co. (Illinois)  1999  600.00  130.00  4.6 
       
Miles v. Philip Morris Inc. (Illinois)  2003  3,100.00  7,100.00  0.4 
       
Jury Punitive Awards       
Hedrick v. Sentry Insurance Co. (Texas)  1993  100.00  2.17  46.1 
       
Forti v. General Dynamics Corp. (California)  1996  100.00  7.40  13.5 
       
Hardy v. General Motors Corp. (Alabama)  1996  100.00  50.00  2.0 
       
Aaron v. Abex Corp. (Texas)  1998  100.00  15.60  6.4 
       
Aultman v. Duncan Manufacturing (Alabama)  1999  100.00  14.50  6.9 
       
City of West Allis v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Wisconsin)  1999  100.00  4.50  22.2 
       
Dorman v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. (Missouri)  2000  100.00  5.00  20.0 
       
Timely Adventures Inc. v. Coastal Mart Inc. (Texas)  2000  100.00  2.10  47.6 
       
Moseley v. General Motors Corp. (Georgia)  1993  101.00  4.24  23.8   25














       
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. KCS Resources Inc. (Texas)  1996  114.09  29.00  3.9 
       
Goodrich v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California Inc. (California)  1999  116.00  4.50  25.8 
       
Robinson v. Ford Motor Co. (Mississippi)  1998  120.00  24.88  4.8 
       
Alcorn v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Missouri)  1999  120.00  40.40  3.0 
       
Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp. (California)  2000  121.00  11.00  11.0 
       
Proctor v. Davis and Upjohn Co. (Illinois)  1991  124.57  3.15  39.5 
       
Micro/Vest v. ComputerLand (California)   1985  125.00  400.00  0.3 
       
Martin v. ServiceMaster Co. L.P.  (Georgia)  1999  135.00  1.26  107.1 
       
Martin v. Children’s Advanced Medical Institutes (Texas)  2000  137.00  131.60  1.0 
       
50-Off Stores Inc. v. Banque Paribas (Suisse) S.A. (Texas)  1997  138.00  12.90  10.7 
       
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (Utah)  1996  145.00  2.60  55.8 
       
In Re: Technical Equities Litigation (California)  1988  147.00  7.00  21.0 
       
Coyne v. Celotex Corp. (Maryland)  1989  150.00  2.00  75.0 
       
Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops Inc. (North Carolina)  1996  150.00  196.96  0.8 
       
The Robert J. Bellott Insurance Agency Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance  1999  150.00  2.70  55.6   26















       
Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc. (Oregon)  2002  150.00 0.17 882.4 
       
Claghorn v. Edsaco (California)  2002  165.00  5.70  28.9 
       
Dominguez Energy L.P. v. Shell Oil Co. (California)  1993  173.00  46.88  3.7 
       
Bartlett v. Mitchell Energy Corp. (Texas)  1996  200.00  4.05  49.4 
       
MMAR. v. Dow Jones (Texas)  1997  200.00  22.70  8.8 
       
City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech (California)  2002  200.00  300.10  0.7 
       
Steele Software Systems Corp. v. First Union (Maryland)  2002  200.00  76.00  2.6 
       
Whittington v. U.S. Steel (Illinois)  2003  200.00  50.00  4.0 
       
Houchens v. Rockwell International Corp. (Kentucky)   1996  210.00  7.70  27.3 
       
Rubicon Petroleum Inc. v. Amoco Production Co. (Texas)  1993  250.00  125.00  2.0 
       
Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp. (South Carolina)  1997  250.00  12.50  20.0 
       
Six Flags Over Georgia L.L.C. v. Time Warner Entertainment Co. L.P. (Georgia)  1998  257.00  197.00  1.3 
       
Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (California)  1999  290.00  5.30  54.7 
       
Perez v. William Recht Co., Inc., dba Durex Industries Inc. (Florida)  1995  300.00  200.00  1.5 
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Fuqua v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. (Texas)  2001  310.00  2.71  114.4 
       
Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund v. Seidel (Maryland)  1988  322.00  65.00  5.0 
       
Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. American Financial Mortgage Corp. (Pennsylvania)  2000  337.50  14.50  23.3 
       
COC Services Ltd. v. CompUSA Inc. (Texas)  2001  364.50  90.00  4.1 
       
Amoco Chemical Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (California)  1993  386.40  36.00  10.7 
       
O'Keefe v. Loewen Group Inc. (Mississippi)  1995  400.00  100.00  4.0 
       
Cassoutt v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (Florida)  2001  400.00  80.00  5.0 
       
IGEN International Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH (Maryland)  2002  400.00  105.00  3.8 
       
Carlisle v. Whirlpool Financial National Bank (Alabama)  1999  580.00  0.98  594.9 
       
Maddux v. Einhorn (Pennsylvania)  1999  752.00  155.00  4.9 
       
Lockheed Litigation Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding, 2967 (California)   1998  760.00  25.40  29.9 
       
Beckman Coulter Inc. v. Flextronics International Ltd. (California)  2003  931.00  2.90  321.0 
       
Cowart v. Johnson Kart Manufacturing Inc. (Wisconsin)  1999  1,000.00  24.00  41.7 
       
Grefer v. Alpha Technical Services Inc. (Louisiana)  2001  1,000.00  56.13  17.8 
       
Hayes v. Courtney (Missouri)  2002  2,000.00  225.00  8.9   28














       
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. (Texas)  1985  3,000.00  7,530.00  0.4 
       
Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc. (California)  2001  3,000.00  5.54  541.6 
       
In re New Orleans Tank Car Leakage Fire Litigation (Louisiana)  1997  3,365.00  2.00  1,682.5 
       
Exxon Corp. v. Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (Alabama)  2000  3,420.00  87.70  39.0 
       
Anderson v. General Motors Corp. (California)  1999  4,775.00  107.60   44.4 
       
In re: The Exxon Valdez (Alaska)  1994  5,000.00  287.00  17.4 
       
Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc. (California) 2002  28,000.00  0.65  43,076.9 
       
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Florida)  2000  145,000.00  12.70  11,417.3 
 
Source: Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, “Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Decide,” Journal of Legal Studies, 2004 (in press).  One additional case has 
been added to that list. 
 
Notes:  The list of cases was compiled by search of various sources as described in Hersch and Viscusi, supra.  The information for most cases is reported in The 
National Law Journal.  Information for Hayes v. Courtney, Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund v. Seidel, and Maddux v. Einhorn is based on reports in the New 
York Times.  Information on Clayton Smith v. Delta is reported in American General Financial, Inc. 1999 10-K form.  The compensatory damages amount in 
Micro/Vest v. ComputerLand is 20 percent of the value of the stock, which plaintiffs estimated to be worth $400 m.  For Bartlett v. Mitchell Energy Corp. we 
include the exemplary damages value of $200 m. under the punitive damages heading.   29
Table 2 





Punitive Damages  2003 State  Punitive Damages 
State  Cases  ($ millions)  Population  per capita 
       
California 15  39,289  35,484,453  1,107 
       
Texas 12  5,014  22,118,509  227 
       
Alabama 4  4,200  4,500,752  933 
       
Illinois 4  4,025  12,653,544  318 
       
Maryland 4  1,072  5,508,909  195 
       
Florida 3  145,700  17,019,068  8,561 
       
Missouri 3  2,220  5,704,484  389 
       
Mississippi  3 687 2,881,281 238 
       
Georgia 3  493  8,684,715  57 
       
Arkansas  2 5,150 648,818 7,938 
       
Louisiana 2  4,365  4,496,334  971 
       
Wisconsin 2  1,100  5,472,299  201 
       
Pennsylvania 2  1,090  12,365,455  88 
       
South Carolina  1  250  4,147,152  60 
       
Kentucky 1  210  4,117,827  51 
       
North Carolina  1  150  8,407,248  18 
       
Oregon 1  150  3,559,596  42 
       
Utah 1  145  2,351,467  62 
       
       
Total 64  215,309 160,121,911  1,345   30
Table 3 
Time Trends in Blockbuster Awards 
 
  Time Period  Number of Awards  Total Amount ($ millions) 
    
Pre-1989 4  3,594 
    
1989-1993 7  1,285 
    
1994-1998 19  12,076 
    
1999-2003 34  198,354 
    
Total 64  215,309   31
Table 4 




a Sample is comprised of jury trials from Table 1, excluding Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
 
** (*) indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1% (5%) level, two-sided tests. 
 Coefficient 
 (standard  error) 
  



























Adjusted R-squared  0.06   32
Table 5 
The Current Status of the Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards 
 
 Case  Reference  Current  Status  Comment 
        
1 Clayton D. Smith, et al. v. Delta 
TV Corporation, Don Acy, US 
Electronics, American General 
Financial Center (Mississippi) 
   No information    
        
2 Avery v. State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Automobile Co. 
(Illinois) 
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 
269 (Ill. App. 2001); Daniel C. Vock, High Court Urged 
to Void $1 Billion Judgment, Chi. Daily L. Bull., May 14, 
2003, at 1. 
Punitives affirmed by appeals 
court; appeal pending in 
Illinois Supreme Court 
Arguments heard before Illinois Supreme 
Court, no opinion yet issued. 
        
3 Price v. Philip Morris, Inc. 
(Illinois) (previously Miles v. 
Philip Morris Inc.) 
Ameet Sachdev, Philip Morris Battles Hard To Stamp 
Out 'Lights' Suits, Chi. Trib., Mar. 17, 2004 at 1; Moody's 
Confirms Altria and Kraft - Kraft's Outlook Changed to 
Stable - Altria's Outlook Negative, Moody's  Investor 
Service Press Release, Sep. 18, 2003; Price v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 941 (Ill. App. 2003). 
Under appeal.   
        
4 Hedrick v. Sentry Insurance Co. 
(Illinois) 
Settlements: Verdicts Reached Before 1994, Nat'l L.J., 
Feb. 6, 1995 at C15. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
        
5 Forti v. General Dynamics Corp. 
(California) 
The Big Numbers of 1996 Verdicts: A Special 
Supplement, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 10, 1997 at C2. 
Under appeal  Punitives reduced to $30 million. 
        
6 Hardy v. General Motors Corp. 
(Alabama) 
Major Defense Verdicts:  
A Roundup of Significant 1996 Cases, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 24, 
1997 at A15. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
        
7 Aaron v. Abex Corp. (Texas)  Verdicts: The Big Numbers of 1998, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 
1999 at C20. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
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 Case  Reference  Current  Status  Comment 
8 Aultman v. Duncan 
Manufacturing (Alabama) 
Margaret Cronin Fisk, 7,600 Volts Equals $114 Million 
Verdict: High-Low Agreement Forestalls Appeal Over 
Ala. Worker's Mishap, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 22, 1999 at A10. 
Settled  Settled based on a confidential high low 
agreement reached before verdict. 
        
9 City of West Allis v. Wisconsin 
Electric Power Co. (Wisconsin) 
Dee Mcaree, Woodchip Award Is Whittled:  $100 Million 
Judgment Is Thrown Out;  A Plaintiff Agrees to $8.7 
Million, Nat'l L.J., June 10, 2002 at A6. 
Settled  Settled with both plaintiffs for $8.65 million 
each when the Wisconsin Supreme Court sent 
the case back for retrial 
        
10 Dorman v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. 
(Missouri) 
Big Gets Bigger: Settlements Reached After Jury Verdict, 
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 19, 2001 at C21. 
Settled  Settled after mediation for a confidential 
amount. 
        
11 Timely Adventures Inc. v. 
Coastal Mart Inc. (Texas) 
Coastal Mart, Inc. v. Timely Adventures, Inc., 2002 Tex. 
App. LEXIS 1941 (Tex. App. 2002). 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
        
12 Moseley v. General Motors 
Corp. (Georgia) 
Andrew Blum, GM Settles Suits; Turmoil Remains:  
Plaintiffs Say Automaker Hides Truth About Trucks, Nat'l 
L.J., Sept. 25, 1995 at A6. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
        
13 Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 
KCS Resources Inc. (Texas) 
The Big Numbers of 1996, Verdicts: A Special 
Supplment; Settlements Reached After Trial, Nat'l L.J., 
Feb. 10, 1997 at C12. 
Settled  Settlement for case estimated at $60 million. 
        
14 Goodrich v. Aetna U.S. 
Healthcare of California Inc. 
(California) 
"Weeping Widow" Case Settled, Conn. L. Trib., Apr. 30, 
2001 at 6. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
        
15 Robinson v. Ford Motor Co. 
(Mississippi) 
Verdicts:  The Big Numbers of 1998:  Settlements 
Reached After Trial, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 1999 at C20. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
              
16 Alcorn v. National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. (Missouri) 
Margaret Cronin Fisk, Jury Took A Poor View of Rail 
Company's Track Record, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 28, 2000 at 
C13. 
Punitives reduced  Punitives reduced to $50 million by trial 
judge. 
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17 Carroll v. Interstate Brands 
Corp. (California) 
Wonder Bread Verdict Sliced, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 23, 2000 at 
A6. 
Punitives reduced (possibly 
under appeal) 
Punitives reduced to $24.3 million.  Defense 
plans to appeal. 
        
18 Proctor v. Davis and Upjohn Co. 
(Illinois) 
Proctor v. Davis, 291 Ill. App. 3d 265 (Ill. App. 1997).  Punitives reduced  The appellate court reduced the punitive 
damages to $6.1 million (approx.). 
        
19 Micro/Vest v. ComputerLand 
(California) 
Brenton R. Schlender, California Court Upholds 
Awarding of ComputerLand Stake to Micro/Vest, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 3, 1989. 
Award waived for stock  The damages award was waived for additional 
8.5% of ComputerLand stock. 
        
20 Martin v. ServiceMaster Co. 
L.P. (Georgia) 
ServiceMaster Co. v. Martin, 252 Ga. App. 751 (Ga. 
App. 2001); W. Melvin Haas, III, et al., 54 Mercer L. 
Rev. 369. 
Reversed Punitives  reversed. 
        
21 Martin v. Children’s Advanced 
Medical Institutes (Texas) 
$268,680,000 Verdict In Suit Alleging Overdose of 
Anesthetic,21 No. 2 VST 64. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
        
22 50-Off Stores Inc. v. Banque 
Paribas (Suisse) S.A. (Texas) 
50-Off Stores, Inc. v. Banques Paribas (Suisse) S.A., 180 
F.3d 247 (U.S. App. 1999); cert. denied 528 U.S. 1078 
(2000). 
Reversed  Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit reversed the 
order on punitive damages. 
        
23 Campbell v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. 
(Utah) 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408 (2003) 
Reversed, remanded.  Award on punitive damages reversed by U.S. 
Supreme Court and remanded. 
        
24 In Re: Technical Equities 
Litigation (California) 
Reversals: Verdicts Reversed By Judges, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 
6, 1995 at C14. 
Settled  The case was settled for a confidential amount 
after the judgment was reversed. 
        
25 Coyne v. Celotex Corp. 
(Maryland) 
Verdicts, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1990 at S3.  Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
        
26 Broussard v. Meineke Discount 
Muffler Shops Inc. (North 
Carolina) 
Verdicts: The Big Numbers of 1998, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 
1999 at C18 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
          35
 Case  Reference  Current  Status  Comment 
27 The Robert J. Bellot Insurance 
Agency Inc. v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. (Alaska) 
Insurance Company Demanded Exclusivity, Nat'l L.J., 
Feb. 28, 2000, at C19. 
Settled  Settled case for $7.5 million. 
        
28 Schwartz v. Philip Morris Inc. 
(Oregon) 
False Claims Alleged for Low-Tar Cigarettes, Nat'l L.J., 
Feb. 3, 2003 at C5. 
Under appeal  Under appeal in the Oregon Court of Appeals. 
        
29 Claghorn v. Edsaco (California)  Big Punitives For Faking Sales of Bogus Software, Nat'l 
L.J., Feb. 3, 2003 at C4; Benjamin Temchine, California 
Jury Verdicts Soar in 2002, The Recorder (SF), Jul. 7, 
2003. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
        
30 Dominguez Energy L.P. v. Shell 
Oil Co. (California) 
Verdicts: The Big Numbers of 1998, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 
1999 at C18; Dominguez Energy L.P. v. Shell Oil Co., 
1998 Cal. LEXIS 3898 (Cal. 1998) 
Reversed  Reversed as a matter of law. 
        
31 Bartlett v. Mitchell Energy Corp. 
(Texas) 
Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 
App. 1997) 
Reversed Punitives  reversed. 
              
        
32 MMAR. v. Dow Jones (Texas)  Judge Disagreed With Jury on the Matter of Libel, Nat'l 
L.J., Feb. 28, 2000 at C22; MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow 
Jones & Co., 187 F.R.D. 282 (U.S. Dist. 1999) 
Reversed  Punitives reversed and new trial granted.  The 
plaintiffs dropped the case. 
        
33 City of Hope National Medical 
Center v. Genentech (California) 
Genentech Retrial Yields $500 Million Outcome, Nat'l 
L.J., Feb. 3, 2003 at C2. 
Under appeal   
        
34 Steele Software v. First Union 
(Maryland) 
Baltimore Bank Loses to a Software Company, Nat'l L.J., 
Feb. 3, 2003 at C2. 
Under appeal   
        
35 Whittington v. U.S. Steel 
(Illinois) 
Tresa Baldas, The Art of Harnessing a Jury's Anger, Nat'l 
L.J., Apr. 21, 2003 at B5. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount. 
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36 Houchens v. Rockwell 
International Corp. (Kentucky) 
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Wilhite, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 
193 (Ky. App. 2003) 
Reversed Punitives  reversed. 
        
37 Rubicon Petroleum Inc. v. 
Amoco Production Co. (Texas) 
Settlements; Verdicts Reached Before 1994, Nat'l L.J., 
Feb. 6, 1995 at C15. 
Settled  Settled for a confidential amount (estimated to 
be 10% of the total verdict of $500 million). 
        
38 Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp. 
(South Carolina) 
Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439 (U.S. 
App. 2001) 
Reversed  Punitives reversed and remanded. 
        
39 Six Flags Over Georgia LL.C. v. 
Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
L.P. (Georgia) 
Aff'd by Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six Flags over Ga., 
254 Ga. App. 598 (Ga. App. 2002); cert. denied123 S. Ct. 
1783 (2002) 
Affirmed  Affirmed in September 2002. 
        
40 Romo v. Ford Motor Co. 
(California) 
Remanded by Ford Motor Co. v. Romo, 123 S. Ct. 2072 
(U.S. , 2003); Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 113 Cal. App. 
4th 738 (2003); Mike McKee, Rules Shift Sharply in 
California; A Restriction on Punitive Damages, Nat'l 
L.J., Dec. 1, 2003 at 1. 
Reversed, remanded.  On 
remand, punitives reduced to 
$23 Million. 
Case remanded in light of State Farm v. 
Campbell, on remand, plaintiffs accepted 
remittitur on punitives to $23 Million. 
           
41 Perez v. William Recht Co. Inc., 
dba Durex Industries Inc. 
(Florida) 
Verdicts: The Big Numbers of 1995, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 5, 
1996 at C2. 
No change  Defendants are out of business (judgment 
proof). 
        
42 Fuqua v. Horizon/CMS 
Healthcare Corp. (Texas) 
Mock Trials, Major Verdict; Attorneys Prep For Nursing 
Home Case With Warm-up Trials, Win $312 Million, 
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 4, 2002 at C17. 
Settled  The whole case was settled for $20 million. 
        
43 Maryland Deposit Insurance 
Fund v. Siedel (Maryland) 
    No information available. 
        
44 Pioneer Commercial Funding 
Corp. v. American Financial 
Mortgage Corp. (Pennsylvania) 
Pioneer Commerical Funding, Corp. and Bank One, 
Texas, N.A., v. American Financial Mortgage Corp., et 
al., 797 A.2d 269 (Pa.Super. 2002). 
Remanded for new trial on 
issue of punitive damages. 
Reduced to $40.5 million by the trial court.  
On appeal, Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
remanded for a new trial on the issue of 
punitive damages. 
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45 COC Services Ltd. v. CompUSA 
Inc. (Texas) 
Business Headed South, Then It Turned Sour, Nat'l L.J., 
Feb. 4, 2002 at C6. 
Under appeal (reversed 
against Halpin & CompUSA, 
reduced against Helu) 
Trial court set aside the verdict against Halpin 
and CompUSA.  Helu and his companies must 
pay $90 million in punitive damages. 
        
46 Amoco Chemical Co. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s of 
London (California) 
Jordan Stanzler & Deborah Mongan, California Recent 
Developments in Bad Faith, at 
http://www.inscobadfaith.net/disclaim.html (last visited 
Feb 28, 2004).  Mealey’s Seminar, Friday 16
th November 
2001, 16-6 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Ins. 12, Dec. 11, 2001.
43 
Reduced on appeal, then 
settled 
The case was settled for a confidential 
amount. 
        
47 O’Keefe v. Loewen Group Inc. 
(Mississippi) 
Willie E. Gary, Front-Load Effort and Win Your Case; 
'The Voir Dire Is the Most Important Part of the Trial' 
Because One Bad Juror Can Spoil Your Chance to Win, 
Nat'l L.J., May 13, 1996, at D5. 
Settled  The case settled.  Loewen paid the plaintiff 
$242 million as settlement for the whole case. 
        
48 Cassoutt v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 
(Florida) 
Cessna Aircraft Settles Seat-rail Lawsuit, Witchita Bus. 
J., Mar. 15, 2002, available at  
http://www.bizjournals.com/wichita/stories/2002/03/11/d
aily50.html 
Settled  The case settled for a confidential amount. 
        
49 IGEN International Inc. v. 
Roche Diagnostics GmbH 
(Maryland) 
IGEN Int'l., Inc., v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH, 335 F.3d 
303 (4th Cir. 2003). 
Reversed  U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit vacated 
both the punitive damages award and the 
compensatory damages award. 
        
50 Carlisle v. Whirlpool Financial 
National Bank (Alabama) 
Door-to-Door Sales Item Cost Nearly 800% More, Nat'l 
L.J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C19. 
Settled  The whole case settled for a confidential 
amount. 
        
51 Maddux v. Einhorn 
(Pennsylvania) 
Alan Fisk, Pressing On For a Fugitive's Debt; Ira 
Einhorn Owes $907 Million. But How Much Is 
Collectible?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13, 2001, at A6. 
No change  Fugitive killer extradited from France. 
        
                                                 
43 According to Lloyd’s Claims Director Scott Moser,  “Companies we've settled with include, alphabetically, Allied Signal, Amoco, Boeing…”  
The outcome of this case is not, however, specifically cited.   38
 Case  Reference  Current  Status  Comment 
52 Lockheed Litigation Cases, 
Judicial Council Coordination 
Proceeding, 2967 (California) 
Lockheed Litigation Cases, No. B156071, 2003 WL 
1908886 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Apr. 22, 2003) 
New trial  Court of Appeals, 2nd District, Division 3, 
California, affirmed the order for a new trial 
granted by the court. 
        
53 Beckman Coulter Inc. v. 
Flextronics International Ltd. 
(California) 
Scott Thurm, Flextronics Will Pay $23 Million to 
Beckman to Settle a Lawsuit, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2003, 
at B3 
Settled  The whole case was settled for $23 million. 
        
54 Cowart v. Johnson Kart 
Manufacturing Inc. (Wisconsin) 
Go-Kart Burns After Modified Gas Cap Falls Off, Nat'l 
L.J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C19. 
Settled  The whole case settled for a confidential 
amount. 
        
55 Grefer v. Alpha Technical 
Services Inc. (Louisiana) 
Sandra Barbier, Harvey Site Retested in Clash Over 
Radiation; Defendants Sharing Samples with DEQ, The 
Times-Picayune, Mar. 18, 2003, at 01. 
Under appeal  Under appeal in the 4th Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
        
56 Hayes v. Courtney (Missouri)  David Twiddy, Courtney's insurer will pay $35M to settle 




Punitives reduced, settled.  The judge reduced punitive damages from $2 
billion to $300 million; settled with insurer for 
$35 million. 
        
57 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. 
(Texas) 
Andrew Blum, First Class Action Reaches Verdict; 
Asbestos Awards May Be Large, Nat'l L.J., May 7, 1990, 
at 3. 
Settled  Settled for $3 billion in December 1987. 
        
58 Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc. 
(California) 
Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc. et al., No. BC 226593, 2001 
WL 1894403, at *15 (Sup. Ct. L.A. County, Cal., Aug. 9, 
2001); Margaret Cronin Fisk, A Marlboro Man's Final 
Roundup, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 4, 2002, at A1. 
Punitives reduced, case on 
appeal. 
The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, 
California reduced the punitive damages to 
$100 million and conditioned the grant of a 
new trial on the ground of excessive punitive 
damages on plaintiff's acceptance of the 
reduction.  Defendant is appealing the 
reduction. 
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59 In re New Orleans Tank Car 
Leakage Fire Litigation 
(Louisiana) 
In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 795 
So.2d 364 (La.App., 4th Cir. June 27, 2001); Alan Fisk, 
Rail Fire Damages Will Stand; Louisiana Federal Court 
Upholds $850 Million Award of Punitives, Nat'l L.J., July 
16, 2001, at A4; A Massive Verdict From '97 Still Blazes 
Forth, Nat'l L.J., Sep. 3, 2001, at C15. 
All but one defendant settled.  
Punitives reduced, on appeal 
to Louisiana Supreme Court. 
All but one defendant settled the punitive 
damages awarded for undisclosed amounts. 
District Court of Louisiana reduced the 
punitive damages award of $2.5 billion 
against CSX to $850 million. Court of Appeal 
of Louisiana, 4th Circuit upheld the decision.  
CSX has appealed to Louisiana Supreme 
Court. 
              
60 Exxon Corp. v. Department of 
Conservation and Natural 
Resources (Alabama) 
Thaddeus Herrick, Judge Cuts Verdict Against Exxon In 
Alabama Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2004, at A6.  Susan 
Warren, Exxon Verdict Reflects Wider Anger: Judgment 
of the $11.9 Billion in Alabama Underscores Distrust of 
Companies, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at A6; Susan 
Beck, How O'Melveny & Myers Built a Litigation 
Powerhouse; California-born firm proves itself on a 
ntional - and international - stage, Legal Times, Jan. 12, 
2004, at Legal Business 1. 
Reversed. Rehearing led to 
$11.8 billion punitive award, 
subsequently reduced to $3.5 
billion by judge; currently on 
appeal. 
Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and 
remanded the case.  Rehearing raised the 
punitive award.  Judge reduced rehearing 
punitive award.  Currently on appeal. 
        
61 Anderson v. General Motors 
Corp. (California) 
GM Agrees to Settlement, Stops Appeal of Billion-Dollar 
Judgment, 2 Mealey's Product Liability & Risk 23, Aug. 
8, 2003. 
Punitives reduced, defendant 
appealed, eventually settled 
for undisclosed amount. 
Superior Court judge reduced the punitive 
damages award to $1.09 billion, defendant 
abandoned appeal, settled for undisclosed 
amount. 
        
62 In re: The Exxon Valdez 
(Alaska) 
David Horrigan, Oil Spill Washes Up On Trial Courts 
Again, Nat'l L.J., Sep. 8, 2003, at 14.; Thaddeus Herrick, 
Judge Tells Exxon to Pay $4.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
29, 2004 at B3. 
Reduced, remanded.  Judge 
raised original reduction.  
Currently on appeal. 
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reduced 
the punitive damages to $4 billion.  The Court 
ordered the U.S. district judge to revisit the 
punitive damages award in light of State Farm 
v. Campbell, on remand, district judge raised 
punitive to $4.5 billion.  Exxon is appealing. 
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63 Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc. 
(California) 
Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc., No. BC 249171, 2002 WL 
31833905, at *3 (Cal. Sup. Ct., App. Div., Dec. 18, 
2002); Carolyn Whetzel, Smoker Accepts Reduced 
Punitive Award in California Case; Both Sides Plan to 
Appeal, 31 (2) Product Safety & Liability Rep., Jan. 13, 
2003, at 24; Benjamin Temchine, California Jury 
Verdicts Soar in 2002, The Recorder (SF), Jul. 7, 2003. 
Punitives reduced, case on 
appeal by both parties. 
The judge reduced the punitive damages to 
$28 million.  California Superior Court, 
Appellate Division conditioned a grant of a 
new trial on the grounds of excessive punitive 
damages on plaintiff's acceptance of a 
reduction of punitive damages to $28 million.  
Plaintiff accepted, but has appealed.  
Defendant also appealed. 
       
64 Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co. (Florida) 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 750 So. 2d 781 
(Fla. App. 2000) rev'd sub nom. Liggett Group Inc. v. 
Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. App. 2003) 
Reversed  Reversed by the District Court of Appeals of 
Florida (3rd District).   41
Table 6 
The Effect of Alternative Punitive Damages Ratio Limits 
 
 



















    
  Blockbuster Awards*  State Court Sample 
    
Total awards  $70.3 billion  $246.0 million 
Total cases  63  171 
    
Ratio Limit=9     
Awards amount  $14.2 billion  $104.6 million 
Percentage of total awards  20  43 
Percentage of total cases  43  96 
    
Ratio Limit=1     
Awards amount  $6.6 billion  $15.2 million 
Percentage of total awards  9  6 




Reversed Cases 20, 22, 23, 30, 31, 
32, 36, 38, 49, and 64
Settled Cases 12, 24, and 46
Affirmed Cases 39
Under Appeal Cases 3, 28, 33, 34, 
and 55
Punitives Reduced Cases 5, 18, and 
45
Appealed Case 5, 58, 59, 63
Possible Appeal Case 17
Retrial Case 52
Settled Cases 26, 48, and 57
Settled Case 9
Appeal Case 44
New Verdict on Appeal 60
Settled Cases 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 21, 25, 27, 
29, 35, 37, 42, 47, 50, 53, 54, and 59 (all but one 
defendant)
Waived for Stock Case 19
Reduced by the Trial Judge Case 16
No Payment Cases 41 and 51
No Information Cases 1 and 43
Figure 1
Flow Chart for Outcomes of Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards
Settled Case 40, 56, 61
Appealed Case 62
Appealed Case 2  43
Figure 2
Shares of Blockbuster Cases and Punitive Damages Awards 
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Figure 3
Shares of State Cases and Punitive Damage Awards 
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Cases Punitive Damages  45
Figure 4
Share of Actual Blockbuster and State Courts Punitive Damages Awards 
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